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AGREEMENTS WITH HELL AND OTHER
OBJECTS OF OUR FAITH
J.M. Balkin*
INTRODUCTION
VOU might think that at a conference devoted to constitutional
Xfidelity, the first question to address is whether the Constitution
deserves our fidelity. Therefore, there is some irony in the fact that
the question is raised in a panel at the very end as we are all getting
ready to go home.
Yet I think that this placement is symbolically appropriate. Fidelity
to the Constitution is something that most constitutional lawyers-
and indeed most citizens-take for granted as an important political
value. Of course one wants to be faithful to the Constitution. What
judge, lawyer or law professor wants to be thought of as unfaithful to
the Constitution? Who wants to be known as a constitutional adul-
terer? It reminds me of Jordan Steiker's comment when a student
asked him whether he believed in a living Constitution: "Yeah, like
I'm going to be in favor of a dead one!"'
I was tempted, in fact, to entitle this Article "In Praise of Constitu-
tional Adultery." But that is not my real goal. I am not here to bury
constitutional fidelity, much less to praise it. As I shall argue in more
detail momentarily, it's not really possible to be against fidelity if one
is seriously interested in interpreting the U.S. Constitution. Fidelity is
the whole point of the enterprise. What we can ask ourselves is what
this enterprise does to us. Fidelity, I shall argue, is not simply a prop-
erty of an interpretation. Fidelity is a feature of a self who disciplines
herself to think and argue in a certain way. Fidelity is the result of
entering into a particular practice of language and thought and al-
lowing one's self to be shaped by this practice. Fidelity is an interpre-
tive attitude that produces psychological pressures on us and affects us
for good or for ill.
If we think of fidelity as a property of a good interpretation, there
can be no question whether fidelity is a good thing or a bad thing.
Only when we understand fidelity in psychological and sociological
terms-only when we see it as a practice of socialization and a disci-
pline of thought that does something to us and to our society---can we
ask the question whether the Constitution deserves our fidelity.
* Lafayette S. Foster Professor, Yale Law School. I am grateful to Bruce Acker-
man, Akhil Amar, Sotirios Barber, Chris Eisgruber, Bob Gordon, Mark Graber,
Michael Klarman, Sanford Levinson, Catharine MacKinnon, Dorothy Roberts, Reva
Siegel and William Treanor for their comments.
1. Quip on file in the author's memory.
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The practice of constitutional fidelity creates social and psychologi-
cal pressures on us because the Constitution exists in a political system
that is certainly not completely just and may in fact be very unjust.
Recognizing that the Constitution we are faithful to might be an evil
Constitution would create enormous cognitive dissonance, because we
face enormous pressures for fealty to the Constitution both as a na-
tional symbol and as the basis of our legal system.
The social and psychological pressures that arise from the practice
of fidelity create three basic kinds of ideological effects. The first is
that we will tend to see the Constitution as standing for whatever we
believe is just, whether it does or not, and whether it ever will be so.
In this way the "true" Constitution can be separated from any evils of
the existing political system. This is a matter of conforming the Con-
stitution to our ideas of justice, and so we might call it interpretive
conformation.
The second possible effect is that we will accept what we think the
Constitution requires as being just, or at least not too unjust. In this
case we conform our beliefs about justice to our sense of what the
Constitution means, and not the other way around. We might call this
interpretive cooptation. It allows us to pledge faith to the Constitu-
tion because we decide that things are not really so bad after all.
Finally, the practice of constitutional fidelity can affect us in a third
way. Immersing ourselves in this practice makes it seem natural for us
to talk and think about justice in terms of the concepts and categories
of our constitutional tradition. In this way, the practice of constitu-
tional interpretation can actually skew and limit our understandings
about justice, because not all claims are equally easy to state in the
language of that tradition.
I. THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL
Within our legal culture the idea of fidelity to the Constitution is
seen as pretty much an unquestioned good. Each member of the bar
takes an oath to uphold the Constitution, and any federal judicial
nominee who professed no interest in fidelity to the Constitution
would soon find him or herself with no political support and no job. I
also suspect that we would find similar sentiments among the general
public, who do not have judges' obligations of role morality, and who
may go through their entire lives without having to swear an oath to
uphold the Constitution.2
Lawyers also do not see the question of fidelity as on the table for
debate; no one who practices law claims to be uninterested in being
faithful to the Constitution. Rather, they are concerned about how to
be faithful. People talk and make arguments in terms of what is faith-
2. That is, unless they are naturalized citizens or are inducted into the armed
forces.
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ful to the spirit or the letter or the history or the traditions of the
Constitution, even if other people believe that they are not being
faithful. Moreover, one gains a decisive rhetorical advantage against
one's opponents if one can show that they are not being faithful to the
Constitution; faced with such an accusation, they must respond by
showing why they are being faithful after all. For the same reason,
constitutional theorists take great pains to demonstrate the fidelity of
their favored constitutional doctrines and their favored methods of
constitutional interpretation. It is not enough that a theory or a doc-
trinal innovation is a really good idea; enormous efforts must be ex-
pended to show that it is also a faithful interpretation of the
Constitution.
It is not accidental that fidelity is seen as a basic and unquestioned
norm, not only at conferences like this one devoted to constitutional
fidelity, but in all constitutional law and virtually all discussions of
constitutional theory. Fidelity is not a virtue but a precondition. It's
not just a good thing, but the point of the practice of constitutional
interpretation. To claim to interpret the Constitution is already to
claim to be faithful to it. Conversely, insisting that one does not care
about fidelity does not simply put one at a severe disadvantage in con-
vincing others to one's point of view; it takes one outside of the lan-
guage game of constitutional interpretation. It is to announce that
one is doing something else-whether political theory, economics or
sociology-but most assuredly not constitutional law. When we say
that fidelity is not important to us, we are no longer interpreting the
Constitution, we are criticizing it.3
If fidelity is an inherent norm in the practice of constitutional inter-
pretation, what could possibly be wrong with it? I think there are two
basic objections one could make to the idea of constitutional fidelity.
The first is that it is impossible and the second is that it is undesirable.
Often claims of impossibility presuppose a controversial notion of
what fidelity is. So someone who thinks that fidelity means only fidel-
ity to the Framers' intentions could argue that fidelity is impossible
because with respect to many important questions these intentions
cannot be known for certain. One way to respond to such objections
is to question their assumptions about the nature of fidelity. We could
reply that fidelity requires more than just adherence to text or inten-
tions. That, of course, is the burden of most of the other papers in the
present symposium. They all hope to explore the ways in which one
can be faithful to the Constitution.4
3. Indeed, even when we criticize the Constitution, we are in some sense offering
what we believe to be a faithful interpretation of it. We are saying that this is what
the Constitution really means and we find it wanting for reasons of social justice or
some other desideratum.
4. A more interesting version of the claim of impossibility would be a claim that
the Constitution is incoherent. We cannot be faithful to the Constitution, the argu-
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My major concern, however, is with the second question-whether
fidelity is undesirable. This is the problem of constitutional evil.5 The
problem of constitutional evil is the possibility that the Constitution is
responsible, directly or indirectly, for serious injustices.6 The argu-
ment from constitutional evil against constitutional fidelity is that the
Constitution does not deserve our fidelity because the Constitution is
either unjust or permits and gives legal sanction to serious injustices.
When we engage in the practice of constitutional fidelity, the argu-
ment goes, we further and help legitimate those injustices. Fidelity
should be offered only to those practices and institutions that are just;
it should not be extended to those that are wicked. This criticism of
constitutional fidelity is really a criticism of the social practice of con-
stitutional interpretation. It argues that it is a practice that sucks us
into something deeply unjust and directs our energies to its
perpetuation.
Now of course, it is possible to argue that only certain parts of the
Constitution are wicked, and that we only have to be faithful to the
ones we admire. However, this seems a fair-weather sort of fidelity.
It's like saying "Well, I'll only be faithful to the Constitution as long as
it's convenient to me or as long as it doesn't upset my political
scruples." When phrased in this way, it seems clear that being a little
bit unfaithful is like being a little bit pregnant. If one is to exercise the
virtue of constitutional fidelity, it must be to the entire document, not
just a part. Of course, in practice it's quite possible that judges and
lawyers exercise selective fidelity to the Constitution. They do so by
ment goes, because the Constitution is an internally contradictory document. One
might argue that the Constitution's calls for democracy and equality cannot be
squared with its more concrete commitments, for example, to equal suffrage of states
in the Senate. Or one could argue that the Constitution employs multiple and con-
flicting visions of liberty, equality and democracy that are invoked inconsistently and
opportunistically. Hence, we are only fooling ourselves in thinking that the Constitu-
tion can be made coherent and as a result we will simply import our own views about
politics into our interpretations, which may or may not be a good thing but it certainly
will not be a practice of fidelity. Yet once again, one can respond to this claim by
arguing that it misunderstands the nature of fidelity. Fidelity requires that we try to
see the object of understanding as possessing some degree of coherence. Otherwise
we cannot tell whether our discovery of incoherence in it is due to the features of the
object or our own lack of understanding of it. At least if our goal is the rational
reconstruction of doctrine, we must try our best to make the Constitution coherent in
our interpretations before we pronounce it incoherent. Of course we might have
other purposes in studying the Constitution, and hence our interpretive attitude to-
ward it might properly be very different. See J.M. Balkin, Understanding Legal Under-
standing: The Legal Subject and the Problem of Legal Coherence, 103 Yale L.J. 105,
128-31 (1993).
5. I borrow this expression from Mark Graber, Dred Scott and the Problem of
Constitutional Evil 3 (1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Fordham Law
Review).
6. The Constitution can be responsible for injustices because it permits them
(e.g., slavery and police abuse), or because it prohibits government from engaging in
reforms necessary to ameliorate them (e.g., the use of the Tenth Amendment to pro-
hibit child labor laws).
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conveniently overlooking or disregarding parts of the Constitution
that they find unpalatable. But for the purposes of this Article, I
want to be forthright about what constitutional fidelity requires of us.
And the question of constitutional evil arises in just this case: If the
Constitution, or parts of it, permits or even requires great evils, why
does it deserve our fidelity?
This is not a hypothetical question. Even today there are features
of our Constitution that sanction great injustices. Of course, if we be-
gan to list them, we would no doubt end up disagreeing about what
they were. Some would point to the ability of legislatures to throttle
economic liberty with regulations, others would point to the ineffec-
tual protection of minority rights, still others would decry the Consti-
tution's grant of a right to slaughter the unborn, and still others would
point to its protection of the power of money to corrupt the political
process. I do not wish to enter into the details of these debates here.
Rather, I want to talk about the general consequences of fidelity to an
unjust Constitution, whatever the parameters of its perfidy. That is
because, as I shall describe later, most citizens have an emotional
stake in the basic justice of our Constitutional institutions, even if they
disagree about marginal elements.8 Thus it is often difficult for many
Americans to confront the problem of pervasive constitutional evil di-
rectly. It is far easier to pick an example from our constitutional past
that most people today would agree was a profound example of con-
stitutional evil: the constitutional protection of slavery.
One of the great debates of the first half of the nineteenth century
was the extent to which the Constitution protected the institution of
slavery. Although the Constitution made oblique references to slav-
ery at several places, the protection of slavery was very much built
into its structure. First, the South was permitted to count slaves as
three-fifths of a person for purposes of bolstering its representation in
the House of Representatives and the Electoral College. Thus, slav-
ery was not only condoned, it was used to buttress the political power
of the slave-holding states. At several points in the antebellum era
key legislation affecting the rights of slave-holders was passed or de-
7. Cf Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 Yale LJ. 637,
639-42 (1989) (arguing that the academic consensus has conveniently overlooked this
part of the Constitution).
8. Dorothy Roberts has pointed out that the felt need to have faith in the Consti-
tution depends very much on one's position in society. Dorothy E. Roberts, The
Meaning of Blacks' Fidelity to the Constitution, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1761 (1997). The
cognitive pressures on different groups may be different: It may be more difficult to
imagine one's self as complicit in and faithful to a fundamentally unjust system than
to imagine one's self as the victim of such a system. Many members of oppressed
groups who have watched the Constitution's promises of social equality repeatedly go
unfulfilled may feel no strong psychological need to pledge faith in the Constitution.
They may have less difficulty accepting the possibility that the American system of
government is fundamentally flawed and unjust. I am indebted to Professor Roberts
for these and many other insights in her fine paper.
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feated only because of the South's additional votes.9 Second, one of
the two unamendable constitutional provisions according to Article V
was Article I's requirement that the slave trade could not be abolished
in this country before 1808.10 Third, the Fugitive Slave Clause pro-
tected the rights of slave owners in slave states by guaranteeing that
free states would act to return slaves to their "lawful" owners." In
Prigg v. Pennsylvania,"2 the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice
Story, held that the Fugitive Slave Clause was self-executing, and au-
thorized slave holders to use self-help to recapture escaped slaves
even in free states. The Court also upheld the Fugitive Slave Act of
1793, which authorized federal judges to return escaped slaves to their
masters. Finally, in Scott v. Sandford,13 Chief Justice Taney, relying on
his view of the original understandings of the Constitution, held that
blacks, even free blacks, were not citizens for purposes of the diversity
clause of Article III." The history of slavery in the United States and
the constitutional responses to that institution raise the issue of consti-
tutional evil in its most profound form. It was for this reason that
William Lloyd Garrison, one of the leading white abolitionists, de-
scribed the Constitution as "a covenant with death, and an agreement
with hell."' 5
Nevertheless, cases like Dred Scott and Prigg complicate the ques-
tion of constitutional evil, for they are admittedly doctrinal glosses on
the Constitution. Indeed, what does it mean to say that the Constitu-
tion itself is evil? Perhaps this is merely an objection that people have
used and interpreted the Constitution in the past to justify serious
evils and disguise or legitimate great injustices. Perhaps people speak-
ing in the name of the Constitution, or even clothed with the authority
of interpreting the Constitution (like judges), have used the symbolic
and legal power of the Constitution to justify an unjust status quo or
to move the country in an even more unjust direction. But this does
not mean that the Constitution itself is evil or unworthy of our fidelity.
It simply means that bad interpretations of the Constitution, which are
themselves unfaithful to its spirit, are evil or unjust. The Constitution
itself (i.e., the best interpretation of it) could still be deserving of our
respect and fidelity. One might point out that some members of an
extremist militia think that the Constitution permits or even requires
9. See William W. Freehling, The Road to Disunion: Secessionists at Bay 1776-
1854, at 442-43, 461-62, 508-09 (1990).
10. See U.S. Const. art. V and art. I, § 9.
11. Id. at art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
12. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 536 (1842).
13. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
14. Id. at 403-19.
15. The phrase comes from a resolution Garrison introduced before the Massa-
chusetts Anti-Slavery Society in 1843: "That the compact which exists between the
North and South is 'a covenant with death, and an agreement with hell'-involving
both parties in atrocious criminality; and should be immediately annulled." Walter M.
Merrill, Against Wind and Tide: A Biography of Win. Lloyd Garrison 205 (1963).
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that all Jews and blacks be expelled from the United States, but this
does not make the Constitution evil; it merely shows that these militia
groups have the wrong interpretation of it. Similarly, Justice Taney's
infamous opinion in Dred Scott, which held that blacks were not citi-
zens for purposes of the diversity clause, was not an example of consti-
tutional evil but of an evil and wrong interpretation of the
Constitution, even if that interpretation was, for a time, incorporated
into the positive law of the United States. In short, just because peo-
ple have used the Constitution for bad ends in the past does not mean
that the Constitution itself is evil or undeserving of our fidelity.
This response solves the problem of constitutional evil by differenti-
ating an ideal Constitution from past interpretations of the Constitu-
tion and past actions done in the name of the Constitution. It tries to
separate the true Constitution or the best interpretation of the Consti-
tution from its various historical interpretations and manifestations. It
hopes to separate the Constitution from parts of the constitutional tra-
dition and even from positive constitutional law. We might call this
project Ideal Constitutionalism.16
Ideal Constitutionalism is an example of what I call interpretive
conformation. It solves the problem of fidelity to an unjust Constitu-
tion by conforming the object of interpretation to our sense of what is
just. This practice is an exaggeration of a perfectly normal feature of
interpretation, and so it is hard to tell where interpretation ends and
conformation begins. When we interpret a text, we must try to under-
stand how the text makes sense; we must try to see the true and good
things in it. Otherwise we cannot be sure that the falsity, evil and
incoherence we find in the text is due to the text itself or our inability
to understand it fully. We might think of ideal constitutionalism as an
overextension of this charitable attitude. Nevertheless, it is a charity
that begins at home, for it conforms the meaning of the Constitution
to our own sense of what is fair and just.
The most extreme example of this tendency is Frederick Douglass,
the leading black abolitionist before the Civil War. Douglas rejected
the conventional view that the Constitution sanctioned slavery. He
argued that the antebellum Constitution made slavery unconstitu-
tional.'7 It is difficult to know what to make of Douglass's bold claim:
One simultaneously wants to admire its audacity and cleverness and
note its importance as a piece of progressive political rhetoric at the
16. Similarly, Mark Graber calls "Perfect Constitutionalism" the position that
"the Constitution requires that our society conform to the best principles of human
governance." Mark A. Graber, Our (Im)Perfect Constitution, 51 Rev. Pol. 86, 86
(1989). The phrase (and the title) are taken from Henry P. Monaghan's famous cri-
tique, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353, 358 (1981).
17. See Frederick Douglass, The Constitution of the United States: Is It Pro-Slav-
ery or Anti-Slavery?, 2 Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass 467-80 (P. Foner, ed.,
1950), reprinted in Paul Brest & Sanford Levinson, Processes of Constitutional Deci-
sionmaking 207-11 (3d ed. 1992).
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same time that one wants to dismiss it legally as off the wall.18 Even-
tually Douglass was proved right-the Constitution now does prohibit
slavery. But it took a Civil War and an explicit constitutional amend-
ment to do it.
Over the years, students of the Constitution have attempted some-
thing very much like Frederick Douglass-although usually to a much
lesser degree and without the moral authority and social influence
that Douglass possessed. They have tried to offer theories of interpre-
tation that produce a "Shadow Constitution" that remedies the posi-
tive law of the Constitution of its existing defects. This Constitution is
likely never to see the light of day, but that does not stop constitu-
tional theorists, who believe either that the mere force of argument
will change the meaning of the Constitution or that the political forces
of the future will somehow vindicate them. Sometimes these gambits
are modest attempts at reform. Sometimes they border on self-
parody.19
At the same time, a small cottage industry has grown up among
constitutional theorists concerning how cases like Dred Scott or Prigg
should have been decided.20 These cases continually trouble constitu-
tional scholars because they lay bare the connection between constitu-
tional theory and the problem of constitutional evil. People use cases
like Dred Scott and Prigg as litmus tests for the worth of their theories
and as means of attacking competing theories. Thus, they say that
Dred Scott and Prigg were wrongly decided because they used the
wrong theory of constitutional interpretation, whether that be original
intention, formalism or substantive due process.21 Some say the prob-
18. Few American lawyers at the time questioned the legality of slavery; indeed
the Constitution's protection of slavery was for many the most powerful indictment of
existing American legal and political institutions. The legal consensus that slavery
was protected by the Constitution produced thorny questions about compensation for
former slave-holders and led to the felt need for a Thirteenth Amendment to the
Constitution rather than subsequent judicial construction.
The best interpretation of Douglass's remarks is that they are part of a tradition of
oppressed groups attempting to hold the Nation responsible for its failed promises.
See infra note 28; Roberts, supra note 8, at 1766-69. Douglass was a public personal-
ity, one of the most prominent opponents of slavery of his time and a leading figure in
a significant social movement. Thus, his aspirational rhetoric was part of a conscious
strategy to influence social attitudes. In this sense, however, his social position was
quite different from that of most contemporary law professors and his political influ-
ence was significantly greater.
19. On the recurring problem of telling the difference between serious constitu-
tional argument and parody, see Jordan Steiker et al., Taking Text and Structure Re-
ally Seriously: Constitutional Interpretation and the Crisis of Presidential Eligibility, 74
Tex. L. Rev. 237 (1995).
20. See Christopher L. Eisgruber, Dred Again: Originalism's Forgotten Past, 10
Const. Commentary 37, 62-63 (1993); Ronald Dworkin, The Law of the Slave Catch-
ers, Times Literary Supp., Dec. 5, 1975, at 1437.
21. For example, Robert Bork and Orrin Hatch, among others, have argued that
the problem with Taney's opinion in Dred Scott was its use of substantive due process,
the theory underlying Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See Robert H. Bork, The
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lem with the decisions is their judicial activism, others insist that these
cases show the folly of judicial restraint. These alternative theories of
constitutional interpretation are refuted precisely because they lead to
unjust results; they can be rejected precisely because they force the
issue of fidelity to constitutional evil.
The assumption implicit in all of these arguments is that when one
has the right interpretative theory of the Constitution, the result is
usually morally appropriate. Such a view is based on the conceit that
the ideal Constitution, using the right methods of interpretation,
might somehow skirt the problem of constitutional evil. In this way,
one can be faithful to the Constitution rightly interpreted, rather than
the positive law of the Constitution, and the problem of constitutional
evil does not arise.
Unfortunately, this gambit cannot be completely successful. We
cannot divorce previous interpretations of the Constitution from the
best reading of that document for two reasons:
First, the Constitution is not merely a document; it is also an institu-
tion and a cultural and political tradition. Indeed, we might say that
the document has legal and political significance because it is embed-
ded in an ongoing set of institutions and an ongoing cultural and polit-
ical tradition. These institutions and this tradition have assimilated
and built upon the constitutional interpretations of the past, both no-
ble and ignoble, good and evil. For this reason it is hard to formulate
many constitutional questions, let alone answer them, except against
the background of existing institutions, cultural understandings and
doctrinal structures. Previous doctrinal glosses make it possible for us
to think about certain constitutional problems as constitutional
problems. These doctrinal glosses and the history of past interpreta-
tions of the Constitution create the conceptual apparatus that is the
common language for raising and recognizing constitutional problems.
For example, we understand the Equal Protection Clause in the way
that we do because of the way it was previously interpreted and the
doctrinal glosses given to it. Our concepts of "heightened scrutiny,"
or "discrete and insular minorities" come from this constitutional tra-
dition, not from the text of the document or the intentions of its Fram-
Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law 28-34 (1990); Transcript to
Confirmation Hearings of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Fed. News Serv., July 22,
1993, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Fed. News Serv. File (remarks of Senator
Hatch). Christopher Eisgruber, on the other hand, has argued that Taney's opinion
was based on a "dogmatic originalism" which looks only to the understandings of the
past while being unconcerned with their injustices. Eisgruber, supra note 20, at 62-63.
Robert Cover famously criticized Justice Story's decision in Prigg as a "retreat[ ] to
formalism" that allowed Story to abdicate responsibility for perpetuating injustice.
See Robert M. Cover, Justice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial Process 241
(1975). Yet Story's decision-striking down Pennsylvania's fugitive slave law and
holding that the Fugitive Slave Clause was self-executing-could just as easily have
been described as an unsound exercise of judicial activism.
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ers. - And these doctrinal glosses are not always so easily removed.
The Constitution is like a building whose later additions respond to
the design limitations placed upon it by the work of earlier architects.
It is like a painting that has been repeatedly touched up by later artists
with a paint that mixes with the old colors. Doctrinal glosses, like
paint, tend to become stuck to the Constitution and can be removed
only with great difficulty. Hence, if we ask the question of whether
homosexuals are protected from discrimination, for example, we con-
ceptualize the question and answer it in terms of categories derived
from these doctrinal glosses. We ask whether sexual orientation is a
suspect classification, or whether homosexuals are exercising a funda-
mental right. And these glosses have their limitations; indeed, they
may actually tend to subvert what is just or hide injustices from our
view. In such a way the discourse of equality has been used not only
to further egalitarian norms but to perpetuate and preserve racial
hierarchy?-3
Thus, when we interpret the Constitution, we are always faced with
the question of what the best interpretation of the Constitution is
given the past we have already had, the institutions we have already
grown up in, the wars we have already fought. We must understand
the Constitution in terms of the history of its authoritative readings,
decisions around which expectations have been created and institu-
tions have grown. We live in a world created by the products of previ-
ous constitutional good and constitutional evil. This tradition weighs
on us, even if we do not feel its weight. It is our constitutional patri-
mony, or to invoke Philip Bobbitt's phrase, our Constitutional Fate.24
Second, even if we equate the Constitution not with its doctrinal
glosses but with a set of abstract ideas, like liberty, equality or due
process, we must face the fact that these ideas are historically embed-
ded abstractions. An historically embedded abstraction is an idea that
people have identified with their own practices and used to justify
them, even though it is always possible to say that they have fallen
short of their own ideals. Thus, the Constitution offers us a complex
of abstract ideas like due process or equal protection in the same way
that concepts like liberalism or democracy or Christianity offer us ab-
stract ideas. The problem is that one cannot fully divorce what people
have made of these abstract ideas from the meanings of these ideas,
even though we recognize at the same time that they have not always
lived up to them. In the world of ideas as in the world of persons, one
tends to be known by the company one keeps.
22. See J.M. Balkin, Constitutional Interpretation and the Problem of History, 63
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 911, 935-37 (1988).
23. On this phenomenon see the interesting discussion in Reva B. Siegel, "The
Rule of Love". Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 Yale L.J. 2117, 2174-88
(1996).
24. Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution (1982).
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The proof of the worth of liberalism, for example, must lie in part in
the actual experience of states that claim to be liberal; the proof of the
actual wisdom of democracy must be understood in terms of the ac-
tual experience of democratic nations, and so on. Theorists some-
times resist this idea. They want to claim that liberal states and
democracies are merely imperfect reflections of these ideas, and that
liberalism and democracy cannot therefore be held accountable for
their failings. This leads to a sort of illicit intellectual bookkeeping:
all of the beneficial features of liberal democracies get attributed to
their being liberal and democratic, while all of their failures are as-
signed to their illiberal or antidemocratic aspects.
I believe this approach is mistaken. I think we have to understand
liberalism as not simply a set of abstract principles, but as a set of
historically emergent ideas that people have used to justify certain
political practices, including some particularly unjust political prac-
tices. All injustices, even the grossest ones, are usually defended by
some set of historically developed ideas, whether they be democracy,
civilization, manifest destiny or Christian salvation. Human beings
just seem to be designed to use such abstractions to defend their ac-
tions. We can laugh at or see through their pretensions, but this does
not mean that these historically emergent ideals cannot be held com-
plicit in these injustices. Rather, we judge the moral worth of such
abstractions in large part by the ways they have been used in the past
by people who claimed to be following them.
To put the matter another way, we must come to terms with the fact
that political ideas and ideals have an ideological content and func-
tion-that ideas are not just ideals for emulation and attainment but
also the means by which injustices like caste, status hierarchy, vio-
lence, aggression and oppression are justified by those who perpetuate
them, both to themselves and to those who must suffer the conse-
quences. Thus, in judging the benefits and detriments of an histori-
cally embedded abstract idea like democracy or liberalism, we must
necessarily take into account its ideological uses and effects, and these
can only be understood through the ways the idea has actually been
wielded in existing historical institutions. We cannot judge the idea
wholly on its historical implementations (for that leaves no room for
its ability to effect beneficial improvement), but neither can we disre-
gard them.
This fact is much easier to see with ideas that have existed in the
distant past, or those in which we do not have a personal stake. It is
much easier for us to identify the doctrine of the Divine Right of
Kings with the foibles of the historical monarchies it was used to jus-
tify, but that is because we have no particular stake in legitimating
monarchies or debating the intricacies of their governing ideologies. I
suspect that many people on the right will laugh skeptically at the
claim that socialism and communism cannot be adequately judged by
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the experience of socialist and communist regimes because socialist
and communist ideas have never been adequately implemented.
What better way, they will say, to know what the practical meaning of
socialism or communism is than to look at the historical experience of
these countries? Some secular people on the left who are appalled by
certain doctrines of Catholic Church regarding women's rights will no
doubt have a similar judgment about Catholicism. Despite George
Bernard Shaw's famous quip that the only problem with Christianity
is that it had never been tried, they will insist that they have at least
some evidence by now of what Catholicism means in practice.
People use historically embedded ideals to justify past and current
practices. Within a tradition people refer to that tradition's ideals and
symbols to give moral and political authority to what they want to do.
The more hallowed the term-like liberty or democracy-the greater
its ability to lend practices some undeserved measure of legitimacy
and authority. We cannot close our eyes to this fact. This point is
even stronger in the case of an ongoing political institution like the
Constitution when the Constitution itself is held up as a venerated
symbol of all that is good about America. The strengths and weak-
nesses of the Constitution necessarily are bound up with the actual
injustices of our current society which claims to be governed by it. We
must recognize and come to terms with the fact that the Constitution,
and hence fidelity to the Constitution, has an important ideological
component and ideological function.
We are not doomed to be slavish dupes of this ideological function.
We can and must be critical about it. But we can only be critical about
it if we pay attention to it, if we recognize that the practice of fidelity
to the Constitution cannot be fully separated from what the Constitu-
tion has been used to justify or permit in the past and what it is cur-
rently used to justify or permit. Claiming that ideological uses of the
Constitution to legitimate injustice are irrelevant to what it means to
be faithful to the Constitution is hiding one's head in the sand. We
cannot simply dismiss the argument that the Constitution does not de-
serve our respect because there is an ideal Constitution that does de-
serve it. That is because even though we can imagine ideal
Constitutions, we are not in control of what the Constitution means.
Even though individuals can have influence over the meaning of the
Constitution, not all individuals have equal influence. The meaning of
the Constitution is determined in large part by the social institutions
and actors who create social meanings, including the judges who cre-
ate doctrinal glosses. If you doubt this fact, look at how law profes-
sors still scurry like rodents to digest the table scraps of Supreme
Court precedents handed to them by judges whom they may no longer
respect and may even openly despise. Even law professors' criticisms
of these doctrinal glosses betray the power of these glosses in shaping
the terms of the debate over the meaning of the Constitution.
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The burden of my remarks so far is to head off the response to the
problem of constitutional evil that identifies the Constitution with a
Shadow Constitution that has never existed. One then can pledge
faith to this Shadow Constitution and avoid the problem of constitu-
tional evil. I hope I have shown that this is too easy a solution. Nev-
ertheless, I do not wish to reject completely the practice of idealizing
the Constitution (or certain parts of the Constitution) and holding this
ideal up as the "real" Constitution or the "true spirit" of the Constitu-
tion. On the contrary, this idealization is an important way that con-
stitutional change occurs under the name of faithful interpretation. It
is to some degree what debates about faithful interpretation are all
about. We continually invoke principles and ideals that we see ema-
nating from the Constitution but imperfectly realized (in our view) in
the body of existing doctrinal glosses and historical traditions. We at-
tempt to persuade others that we are adverting to the true spirit of the
Constitution even as our opponents claim that we are being faithless.
This process is the process of constitutional interpretation; it is what
constitutional fidelity involves. Through this process fidelity is manu-
factured. I use this expression without disrespect or cynicism. Fidelity
is activity, process, coming into being. To be faithful involves the con-
tinuation of a tradition, which is then read back into the tradition ret-
roactively as having always been a part of it. And to some extent the
continuation always was part of the tradition, for it was one of the
possible lines of continuation. But it is only partly true, for the contin-
uation of any tradition must necessarily kill off other possible lines of
development, and relegate them to the margins or brand them as he-
retical.' That is the sense in which tradition is also extradition.26 Fol-
lowing tradition is also a form of leading, of moving outward into the
present under the banner of the past, of making the new out of the
materials of the old.
Because faithfulness is the continuation of a tradition, it always in-
volves variation as well as conformity. The conceit of tradition is its
disguise of change under the name of continuity, its mask of perma-
nence hiding the work of transfiguration. The problem of fidelity is
precisely the problem presented by living and working within such a
tradition. It is how to reconcile our sense of the ideals emanating
from the Constitution with our Constitutional Fate: the history of
glosses and glosses on glosses, the embedded practices and under-
standings, the injustices and evils that form our ambivalent inheri-
tance. This predicament-how to reconcile the ideals we see in the
Constitution with the evils we cannot close our eyes to-is the predic-
ament of fidelity. It is the happy but deluded person who sees only
25. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term-Forewor& Nomos and
Narrative, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 15, 53-54 (1983).
26. On this point, see J.M. Balkin, Tradition, Betrayal, and the Politics of Decon-
struction, 11 Cardozo L. Rev. 1613, 1619-20 (1990).
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these ideals but not the evils; it is the cynic who sees only the evils but
not the ideals; it is the wise person who sees both and feels the tug
that both exert on the spirit. She alone understands the true price of
fidelity.
The Constitution cannot be a perfect document. It was fashioned
by imperfect people in imperfect times and entrusted to future gener-
ations for its interpretation; and the people and the times have gotten
no more perfect since. Although we should be suspicious of a theory
of constitutional interpretation that sanctions great evils, we should be
equally suspicious of any theory of constitutional interpretation that
always avoids their possibility.
One might think that this is a criticism of an aspirational theory of
constitutional interpretation-a theory that sees the Constitution as
containing elements that aspire to a more just society.2 7 It is not. In-
deed, my own views of constitutional interpretation are largely aspira-
tional. Even under an aspirational view of the Constitution, one must
still face the problem of constitutional evil. Indeed, I would argue
that an aspirational approach must accept the problem of constitu-
tional evil most clearly and forthrightly.2
27. See, e.g., Sotirios A. Barber, On What the Constitution Means (1984) (elabo-
rating on the implications of apirational thinking on constitutional theory); Robin
West, The Aspirational Constitution, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 241 (1993) (advocating an
aspirational interpretation of the Constitution).
28. Members of oppressed groups often speak about the Constitution in aspira-
tional terms. For some this is an act of faith in a Constitution that they believe will
eventually vindicate their fidelity and grant them full and equal citizenship. But even
for those who lack such faith, this rhetoric serves an important function as a demand
for justice. For this latter group of nonbelievers the Constitution is more like a person
who has repeatedly refused to pay a debt, or a spouse who has repeatedly been un-
faithful. At some point one simply wants to insist that deadbeats and philanderers
end their hypocrisy and live up to the obligations they have assumed. Thus the atti-
tude of many who have been left out of the promises of the Constitution may not be
one of belief in the ultimate goodness of the American constitutional system. It may
rather be an attitude of "speaking truth to power"-making a demand that the Con-
stitution should live up to its promises of justice and equality.
However, the trope of the unfulfilled debt also appears in the language of the con-
stitutionally faithful. I believe that Frederick Douglass's aspirationalism is best un-
derstood in this light. By reading the Constitution "literally," and in light of the
principles of the Declaration of Independence, Douglass was attempting to hold white
Americans responsible for the promises they made in the Constitution. Douglass was
attempting to collect on a moral debt, so to speak, created at the founding of the
United States. See Roberts, supra note 8, at 1768. Roberts is correct that one does not
have to believe in the essential justness of the Constitution to collect on such a debt,
any more than one has to believe in the essential creditworthiness of a deadbeat when
one demands that he or she pay up. However, the language of debt is often mingled
with the language of faith: Martin Luther King's famous "I Have a Dream" speech
invokes the metaphor of debt while also pledging faith in the eventual justness of
American constitutionalism:
So we've come here today to dramatize a shameful condition. In a sense
we've come to our nation's capital to cash a check. When the architects of
our republic wrote the magnificent words of the Constitution and the Decla-
ration of Independence, they were signing a promissory note to which every
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The best version of an aspirational account, I think, is one that rec-
ognizes that the Constitution is an imperfect document fashioned as a
result of political compromise and limited vision, but that it neverthe-
less contains features and concepts that urge us to make our own insti-
tutions more just. The most obvious candidates for these concepts are
the most abstract ones: hence the general phrases of "due process"
and "equal protection" seem to possess an aspirational character. Yet
we can read less general phrases aspirationally as well. The First
Amendment states merely that Congress shall make no law abridging
the freedom of speech; yet I think the best interpretation of this clause
is as a general protection of freedom of expression, political activity
and conscience, deeply tied to emancipatory processes of self-govern-
ance. This example shows that it is sometimes reasonable to give a
limited text a more general and aspirational character. I think a simi-
lar point could be made about the Privileges and Immunities Clauses,
the Republican Government Clause, the Title of Nobility Clauses, and
the Bill of Attainder Clauses, although I recognize that this has not
happened in the doctrinal tradition.29
Even though it is possible to read certain portions of the Constitu-
tion aspirationally, there are large parts of the text that resist such an
interpretation. I do not merely mean the structural guarantees and
provisions that set up the general housekeeping of the Republic.
There are any number of clauses in the Constitution that seem to re-
flect the concerns of an earlier age. They exist even in the hallowed
Bill of Rights.
We tend to forget that the original Bill of Rights was originally
twelve articles, not ten. The other two proposed amendments are im-
portant because they give us a greater sense of the Bill's structure.
They are by no means foreign to the spirit of the Bill of Rights but
help us to see more clearly what that Bill was. The second of the
original twelve articles concerned compensation for Senators and
Representatives; it was eventually enacted as the Twenty-Seventh
American was to fall heir. This note was the promise that all men, yes, black
men as well as white men, would be guaranteed the unalienable rights of life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
It is obvious today that America has defaulted on this promissory note in
so far as her citizens of color are concerned. Instead of honoring this sacred
obligation, America has given the Negro people a bad check; a check which
has come back marked "insufficient funds." We refuse to believe that there
are insufficient funds in the great vaults of opportunity of this nation. And
so we've come to cash this check, a check that will give us upon demand the
riches of freedom and the security of justice.
Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream, Address at March on Washington, D.C., for
Civil Rights (Aug. 28, 1963), in A Testament of Hope: The Essential Writings of
Martin Luther King, Jr., at 217, 217 (James M. Washington ed., 1986).
29. But see Daniel A. Farber, "Terminator 2 1/2": The Constitution in an Alternate
World, 9 Const. Commentary 59 (1992) (showing how absent the Bill of Rights these
clauses could have been turned into basic guarantees of human rights).
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Amendment.3" The first article of amendment ensured an upper limit
on the size of Congressional districts as the population grew.31 Thus,
our First Amendment was really the Third.
These provisions reveal more clearly that the Bill of Rights was and
is not merely a charter of abstract liberties. It contains structural
guarantees of federalism like those in the Tenth Amendment. It re-
fers to specific procedural mechanisms-like the grand jury and the
warrant-that are peculiar to the traditions of Great Britain and need
not form a part of a just society. Indeed, many people think that some
of these guarantees-the basic structure of an adversarial system in
criminal cases and the requirement of trial by jury in all federal civil
cases over twenty dollars-hamper the pursuit of justice.
Finally, we come to the Second and Third Amendments. Most peo-
ple think that the Third Amendment is of limited relevance because it
seems to address only the question of quartering troops in people's
homes. Thus, Ronald Dworkin gives it as a prime example of a clause
that cannot be aspirational, because it is too specific in its origins. 32 I
am not sure about that; I do not see how its level of specificity is that
much different from the First Amendment or the Titles of Nobility
Clauses. Yet I need not press that point here. The Third Amendment
presents few problems for aspirationalists because at worst it seems
innocuous and unlikely to do much mischief. 33 The Second Amend-
ment, on the other hand, presents greater difficulties, especially for
present day liberals who support gun control. Hence, as Sanford Lev-
inson has argued, the Second Amendment is an embarrassment, which
is largely ignored in contemporary constitutional law casebooks and
theoretical discussions.34 When it cannot be ignored, it is domesti-
cated to the fullest extent possible. This may be fidelity to the Consti-
tution, but I doubt it.
This is not to say that there cannot be aspirationalist interpretations
of the Second Amendment. I am most intrigued by the possibility that
the Second Amendment is actually designed to guarantee every
American the right to serve in the Armed Forces and thus gain the
rights of full citizenship that traditionally have attached to the as-
sumption of this responsibility.35 Under this interpretation, a blanket
30. With some controversy. See Richard B. Bernstein, The Sleeper Wakes: The
History and Legacy of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 497, 499,
504-08, 541-42 (1992).
31. Id. at 530-31; Creating the Bill of Rights: The Documentary Record from the
First Federal Congress 3 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991).
32. See Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American
Constitution 8, 14, 72 (1996).
33. And, read aspirationally, it might be thought to impose a general duty of gov-
ernment to act according to law even during time of war. I am indebted to Sanford
Levinson for this point.
34. Levinson, supra note 7, at 639-42.
35. See Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L.J. 1131,
1162-73 (1991); Carl Riehl, Uncle Sam Has to Want You: The Right of Gay Men and
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exclusion of gays from the military would violate the Second Amend-
ment because by denying them the opportunity to serve their country,
it also denies them their right to establish themselves as full and equal
citizens. Nevertheless, this egalitarian and aspirationalist interpreta-
tion is tied to a view of the world in which bearing arms and inflicting
violence on others is part of one's duty as a citizen. It is unclear that
this interpretation can fully separate itself from the more violent as-
pects of American civic republicanism. It too cannot free itself from
the problem of constitutional evil.
Clauses like the Second Amendment repeatedly poke holes in our
pretensions to Grand Constitutional Theory. They show us what we
should have already known, that no theory of constitutional interpre-
tation can make the Constitution perfect, or can postpone or avoid the
possibility that the Constitution does not require that we be good and
that our institutions be just. Our theories of the Constitution are
makeshift attempts, reflecting the concerns of our era, but dressed up
as timeless claims about interpretation. Roe' and Brown37 have pro-
duced their own idiosyncratic problematics, as Lochner3s did in an
earlier era, and with different results. The constitutional theories we
offer are usually inspired by and designed to solve the doctrinal
problems of our present age; they are usually embarrassed when we
apply them to constitutional provisions not currently in view or trans-
fer them to the constitutional questions of a different era. Imagine a
legal process interpretation of the Fugitive Slave Clause, for example,
or a fundamental rights approach to the Second Amendment. Con-
versely, as the constitutional approaches of the past are repeated in
the present, their political valence changes, producing awkward and
embarrassing results for the constitutional theorist. This ideological
drift is not accidental. It is the result both of the imperfect nature of
the intellectual tools we use to interpret the Constitution as well as the
imperfect nature of the document we interpret.39
How, then is this realization consistent with an aspirationalist vision
of the Constitution? Not only is it consistent with it, it is the aspira-
tionalist vision. In the aspirationalist view, we, our institutions and
our Constitution, always exist in a "fallen condition." We begin as
sinners, and we hope for redemption. Our Constitution, which offers
the hope of redemption, is no less imperfect than we are, even for all
of its grand promises. We, too, are imperfect, and we too make
promises. Our Constitution is like ourselves, imperfect, a collection of
Lesbians (And All Other Americans) to Bear Arms in the Military, 26 Rutgers LJ. 343
(1995).
36. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
37. Brown v. Board of Ed., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
38. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
39. On the theory of "ideological drift," see J.M. Balkin, Ideological Drift and the
Struggle over Meaning, 25 Conn. L. Rev. 869 (1993).
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moral and political compromises, yet with the urge and the ambition
to become better than it is now. To be an aspirationalist is not to view
the Constitution as a perfect thing but as an imperfect thing begging
us to take its promises seriously. The point of aspirationalism is not to
overlook the Constitution's faults but to recognize them honestly and
accept them as the premise upon which aspiration must build. The
aspirationalist vision is one of redemption. There can be no redemp-
tion without the recognition of sin.
Thus, even at the moment when we want to read the Constitution as
aspiring to great justice, we must soberly reflect on its evils, both po-
tential and realized. Indeed, I tend to think that theories of the Con-
stitution that do not recognize the presence of constitutional evil, that
tend to make everything come out happily in the end, are not truly
aspirational. Nor do I think that they show fidelity. I think they are
apologetic and self-deluding. When we have faith in others in down-
trodden circumstances-a drug addict, a criminal or an alcoholic-we
do not simply pretend that they are something they are not: physically
and spiritually healthy. We must understand them for what they are
now, and see the possibilities of what they could be. This is what it
means to have faith in them: to recognize the promise within, a prom-
ise that hopes to burst forth from the misery of their condition and the
darkness of their souls. When we pretend that everything is aln right
with them, we engage in happy talk. This happy talk comes not from
faith but fear of facing reality. True faith involves being willing to see
evil flourishing while still hoping for the eventual growth of the good.
II. FIDELITY AND THE LEVINSONIAN WAGER
The problem of constitutional evil becomes even more obvious
when we consider how constitutions come about. When we watch
other countries form their constitutions, we are often struck by the
many compromises they must make with prior regimes and the injus-
tices of those regimes. Consider, for example, the problems of consti-
tution making in Eastern Europe, South Africa or the former
Yugoslavia. The production of these new constitutions requires dis-
tasteful compromises with previous evils and gerrymandered features
designed to smooth the transition from the old regime to the new.4"
Such constitutions are messy and untidy, so compromised that many
of the drafters often wish they did not have to sign them. They are
unsure whether signing is a great act of statesmanship or an even
greater act of betrayal. Yet what we are witnessing is the normal case
of constitutional politics. And looking at these new constitutions
should remind us that everything we see in them is true of our own
Constitution. Our own Constitution was also the result of an escape
40. On this point, see the very interesting discussion in Ruti Teitel, Transitional
Justice, 106 Yale L.J. (forthcoming 1997).
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from a previous regime, a revolution with its own compromises and
inadequacies. The States, big and small, North and South, had to be
persuaded to join the Union; the interests and concerns of different
property owners-including both mercantile interests and slave-hold-
ers-had to be assuaged. We might make a similar point about the
compromises necessary to reorganize the Union and the Constitution
after the Civil War. The injustices of the status quo are always contin-
ued in a new constitution even as it seeks to remedy some of them.
All constitutions are agreements with hell.
Because of the imperfections of all constitutions, the question of
constitutional fidelity necessarily becomes a question of constitutional
faith.4 ' And this is borne out in the etymology of the word itself. The
word fidelity comes from the Latin "fides," meaning trust or faith.
Faith, in turn, is defined as a "confident belief in the truth, value, or
trustworthiness of a person, an idea, or a thing.' '4 2 Thus, to have fidel-
ity is to be faithful-literally, to be full of faith, full of confidence in
the value of that which we are faithful to.
This etymology shows us the deep connections between fidelity and
faith: To be faithful to someone or something is simultaneously to
have faith in someone or something. Fidelity is a two-way street; it is
a relationship between oneself and another. One is faithful to the
other in part because one expects the other to be faithful to oneself.
Of course, one does not know that the other will be faithful, and
often the other is not. Thus, faithfulness is also faith in the other's
fidelity. To be faithful is to be faithful even though one does not know
whether the other will live up to the other's obligations. Hence, to be
faithful is to trust, to make a leap of faith. Conversely, to be faithless
also has a double meaning. It means both to lack faith and to betray a
trust. A faithless person both lacks trust and cannot be trusted; she is
unreliable and disloyal. Indeed, she may become disloyal precisely
because she no longer believes in the institution she once trusted, or
because she is emotionally incapable of such trust.
There is an important connection between fidelity and the existen-
tial commitment of trust. Often when one loses faith in another, one
no longer feels the obligation to be faithful to that person. Of course,
this is not always the case. For example, if a person's spouse is repeat-
edly unfaithful, one might still be faithful to him or her. But even in
that case one still trusts in something-one believes that the sanctity
of marriage is valuable, one trusts that marriages are worth preserving
for the sake of some greater good, or perhaps one holds out the hope
that the other will return from his or her erring ways. Thus, when one
is faithful to another, one still has a commitment to something, even if
it is no longer to a flesh-and-blood person but to an abstraction or a
41. See Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith (1988).
42. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 677 (3d ed. 1992).
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moral principle. Faithfulness always requires trust and belief in some-
thing, whether it is a person or an institution, a tradition or an ideal.
In the same way, to have fidelity to an institution, one must also
believe in it. When one becomes part of an institution, one must
make a leap of faith. One must believe that, on the whole, the institu-
tion is a good thing, and not a bad thing, and that to further its pur-
poses is also, on the whole, a good thing, and not a bad thing. Even if
particular actions one does on behalf of the institution are personally
troubling, one must believe that, in the long run, hewing to one's insti-
tutional role means that things will work out for the best. This is a
very common notion among lawyers, who are often required to make
arguments they do not believe and defend clients and causes they do
not personally support. Sometimes lawyers think that their represen-
tation of clients is a good thing because they believe in their clients'
causes. They believe (or convince themselves) that the furtherance of
their clients' interest is also the furtherance of the public interest. But
more often, they defend their actions on the grounds that the entire
practice of legal representation is a basically just one, or more just
than any feasible alternative. They make an argument about their
role within a larger institutional framework. Role morality is based
ultimately on a faith in the value of the institution that creates the
role.4 3 If one's role as a lawyer requires one to do a distasteful thing,
one can still fall back on the justice of the general system of legal
representation. But if one lacks faith in the institution, it becomes
harder to justify one's participation in specific conduct that one finds
distasteful.
Sanford Levinson closes his book, Constitutional Faith, with the
question whether one should sign the Constitution of the United
States." In particular Levinson asks whether one should have signed
the Constitution of the United States in 1787, given its implicit protec-
tion of slavery and its omission of the Bill of Rights. He finds this
question extremely difficult.45 In the end, Levinson grudgingly admits
that he would sign the document, because of a sense of faith that the
country would live up to its promise of freedom. He argues that the
language of the Constitution and the constitutional tradition is suffi-
ciently flexible to allow amelioration over time, even if some of the
necessary interpretations are currently unpersuasive.46 Levinson's
constitutional faith, for all of its anxieties, is also an optimism-a be-
lief that, despite recurrent adversities and failings, things will work out
well in the end. Levinson's gamble is that the story of the U.S. Consti-
43. Cf. David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study 128-32 (1988) (argu-
ing that justification for lawyers' role depends ultimately on justification of institu-
tions lawyers participate in).
44. Levinson, supra note 41, at 180.
45. Id at 180-91.
46. Id at 192-93.
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tution will ultimately turn out to be a comedy rather than a tragedy, or
a story with no determinate end and no clear moral. In every comedy,
the hero must encounter obstacles and overcome them, and so the
existence of constitutional evil, even profound evil, does not shake our
faith as long as we believe that such evils will eventually be eradicated.
As the Psalmist says, "when the wicked spring up like grass, and all
evil doers flourish, it is that they may be destroyed forever."47
Levinson's constitutional faith is offered in the face of the possibil-
ity and the reality of the Evil Constitution. Thus, we might think of it
as a gamble on the future. In this sense, it might seem to resemble
Pascal's famous wager on the existence of God./s However, Pascal
offered a mathematical proof to demonstrate the reasonableness of
the wager, whereas Levinson can offer no such proof. In this sense
Levinson's wager is much more a matter of faith than Pascal's.
Justice Story's opinion in Prigg v. Pennsylvania also reflects a cer-
tain kind of wager. Story believed that by upholding the right of slave
owners to regain their slaves he would preserve a greater good, the
preservation of the Union and its Constitution. Implicit in Story's
wager is the same assumption: faith that preserving the Union is a
good thing, because at the end of the day, there will turn out to be no
serious long-term conflict between the Constitution and social justice.
Story's wager, though, is different from Levinson's in an important
respect. Story was at the time a sitting United States Supreme Court
Justice. The vindication of his faith is much more in his hands than it
could ever be in Levinson's. And his practice of offering constitu-
tional interpretations is also importantly different. A good argument
about the meaning of the Constitution from Levinson and a good ar-
gument made by Story may look identical but they have very different
effects: One is merely the musings of a law professor, the other repre-
sents one-fifth of the votes needed to change the meaning of the
Constitution.50
47. Psalms 92:7.
48. Blaise Pascal, Pensees 149-55 (AJ. Krailsheimer trans., 1966).
49. 41 U.S. 539, 623-25 (1842).
50. We might also contrast Justice Story's situation with the so-called "inferior"
court judge who sits in a federal trial or circuit court It is important to remember
that in interpreting the federal Constitution, the work of inferior court judges is al-
most exclusively doctrinal. They are required to figure out and enforce what the
Supreme Court and other higher courts want them to do, regardless of their own
views of the justness of higher court precedents. See Sanford Levinson, On Positivism
and Potted Plants: "Inferior" Judges and the Task of Constitutional Interpretation, 25
Conn. L. Rev. 843, 845 (1993). The Supreme Court has been particularly jealous of its
power to shape constitutional law. It has repeatedly rebuked lower courts for at-
tempting to change the Constitution by disregarding the Supreme Court's views:
"[U]nless we wish anarchy to prevail within the federal judicial system, a precedent of
this Court must be followed by the lower federal courts no matter how misguided thejudges of those courts may think it to be." Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982)
(per curiam).
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I emphasize this point because we might think that one answer to
the problem of constitutional evil is to take constitutional idealism se-
riously: By discussing and arguing about the Constitution among our-
selves, legal academics can contribute to the constitutional tradition
and change its trajectory. We can be the masters of our own constitu-
tional destiny.5'
This solution to the problem of constitutional evil is appealing be-
cause it envisions legal academics as having a significant effect on the
Constitution. By writing about the importance of justice in constitu-
tional interpretation, by engaging in an ongoing conversation with
others about the meaning of the Constitution, they can actually make
the Constitution more just. Yet this is a fool's errand for most of the
law professors who write and think daily about the Constitution. It is
a confusion of their role with the role of the Supreme Court Justice.52
Even if participating in arguments about the Constitution is a possible
solution to the problem of constitutional faith for Justice Story, it is
not a possible solution for the vast majority of American law profes-
sors, or, indeed, the vast majority of American citizens.
The articulation of constitutional ideals by different parties may
look grammatically identical but its social meaning and social effect is
quite different.53 The construction of constitutional systems by the av-
erage law professor at the average American law school has only a
minuscule effect on the direction of the Constitution's meaning. For
them, as for most Americans, constructing a Shadow Constitution is
51. Consider, for example, Levinson's defense of his faith:
For me, signing the Constitution-and agreeing therefore to profess at least
a limited constitutional faith--commits me not to closure but only to a pro-
cess of becoming and to taking responsibility for constructing the political
vision toward which I strive, joined, I hope, with others. It is therefore less a
series of propositional utterances than a commitment to taking political con-
versation seriously.
Levinson, supra note 41, at 193.
52. On this point, see Pierre Schlag, Clerks in the Maze, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 2053
(1993).
53. This is not a claim about the exclusive power of Supreme Court Justices to
shape the meaning of the Constitution. Rather, it is a more general point about the
social force of arguments about the Constitution made by different people in different
social positions. One can point to many key historical figures who were not judges,
like Abraham Lincoln or Martin Luther King, and who changed the meaning of the
Constitution by their words and deeds. Lincoln was not a judge but a politician, and
King was never elected to any office. But Lincoln was the President of the United
States, and King was one of the most important American political figures of the
twentieth century.
Most legal academics, like most citizens, are neither Supreme Court Justices nor are
they key historical figures like Lincoln or King. They may make statements and offer
arguments that look rhetorically similar to statements by these figures but they will
not have the same effect in shaping the meaning of the Constitution. We must not
confuse the force of reason-the correctness or justness of our arguments about what
the Constitution should mean-with the force of our reasoning: the social power that
our arguments will have because of who we are and what we do.
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shadow boxing. It does not avoid the real problems of constitutional
faith.
Justice Story's faith in the Constitution is importantly different pre-
cisely because he is able to turn the Constitution to the path of what
he regards as just. Of course, the very fact that Story was presented
with a case like Prigg shows that even Supreme Court Justices have
limited control over events that affect the Constitution's meaning.
And in any case, he does not act alone-he must convince four of his
other colleagues. But these limitations on Justice Story simply sup-
port the larger point I wish to make: To have faith in the Constitution
is to have faith in an ongoing set of institutions whose meaning the
individual will not be able to control. Most of us participate only in
the great mass of public opinion that eventually affects the meaning
and direction of the Constitution; our views are like a drop of water in
a great ocean. We cannot mold the object of our faith to our will; its
eventual trajectory is largely out of our hands.
And what, then, if our constitutional faith is shaken? What if we
come to believe that fidelity to the Constitution will not eventually
achieve social justice, but that it will, on the contrary, preserve and
even expand pervasive social injustices? It would be like discovering
that the God we worshiped was not in fact good but was indifferent or
even evil; that He did not care about us or about our well being and
might be actively hostile to us. Should we have faith in such a God at
that point? Should we even come to doubt His existence? It is no
accident that one of the most difficult arguments put forward by athe-
ists against the existence of God is the Argument from Evil. Explain-
ing the existence of evil, and constructing theodicies, has been a
constant task for generations of theologians.-' Of course, there is no
question of not believing in the existence of the Constitution. But we
might well doubt whether our Constitution deserves our fidelity, just
as we might come to wonder whether the god we thought we were
worshipping was actually a demon.
III. WHAT CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH DoEs TO Us
But constitutional fidelity, I think, is more than simply a gamble on
a horse that might not pay off. The practice of constitutional fidelity,
like fidelity to other institutions, has important psychological effects
on the self. To be faithful to an institution is to enter into a world, to
accept a certain way of talking and a certain discipline of thought. It is
to adopt a grammar that is not merely a vessel of thought and expres-
sion but subtly shapes and forms the processes of thought itself. At its
best, fidelity is a virtue; at its worst it is a pathology.
54. On the connection between legal and theological theodicies, see Levinson,
supra note 41, at 59-60.
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Over time, the word "fidelity" has been extended from a descrip-
tion of a relationship between persons to a relationship between a
thing and something else that corresponds to it. Hence, we speak of a
faithful likeness or a faithful representation. But this way of talking
disguises the existential element in interpretation. Fidelity is not sim-
ply a matter of correspondence between an idea and a text, or a set of
correct procedures for interpretation. It is not simply a matter of
proper translation or proper synthesis or even proper political philos-
ophy. Fidelity is not a relationship between a thing and an interpreta-
tion of that thing. Fidelity is not about texts; it is about selves.
Fidelity is an orientation of a self towards something else, a relation-
ship which is mediated through and often disguised by talk of texts,
translations, correspondences and political philosophy. Fidelity is an
attitude that we have towards something we attempt to understand; it
is a discipline of self that is related to the discipline of a larger set of
selves in a society. Fidelity is ontological and existential; it shapes us,
affects us, has power over us, ennobles us, enslaves us. Fidelity is a
form of power exercised over the self by the self and by the social
forces that help make the self what it is. As such, fidelity is an equivo-
cal concept, full of both good and bad, mixed inextricably together.
Fidelity is the home of commitment, sacrifice, self-identification and
patriotism, as well as the home of legitimation, servitude, self-decep-
tion and idolatry.
If the Constitution is an evil thing, fidelity to that thing is danger-
ous. It is dangerous not simply because fidelity furthers the work of
evil, but because of what fidelity does to the faithful. Fidelity is a sort
of servitude, a servitude that we gladly enter into in order to under-
stand the Constitution. To become the faithful servants of the Consti-
tution, we must talk and think in terms of it; we must think
constitutional thoughts, we must speak a constitutional language. The
Constitution becomes the focus of our attention, the prism of our per-
spective. Our efforts are directed to understanding it-and many
other things in society as well-in terms of its clauses, its concepts, its
traditions. Through this discipline, this focus, we achieve a sort of tun-
nel vision: a closing off to other possibilities that would speak in a
different language and think in a different way, a closing off to worlds
in which the Constitution is only one document among many, worlds
in which the Constitution is no great thing, but only a first draft of
something much greater and more noble. And to think and talk, and
focus our attention on the Constitution, to be faithful to it, and not to
some other thing, we must bolt the doors, shut out the lights, block the
entrances. Fidelity is servitude indeed. But this servitude is not so
much something the Constitution does to us as something we do to
ourselves in order to be faithful to it.
If we are the sort of people who see constitutional fidelity as an
unquestioned virtue, who write articles and make arguments about
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whether such and such is a faithful interpretation of the Constitution,
who accuse others of infidelity as if this were a serious sin, what does
this say about what we are and what we have become? We need to
consider what the acknowledgement of fidelity as a constitutional vir-
tue presupposes, not about the nature of language or political philoso-
phy, but about the nature of the self.
One sometimes doubts that lawyers and politicians take the lan-
guage of fidelity seriously. Perhaps lawyers and politicians do not re-
ally believe in the Constitution; perhaps they are being faithful to
something else. That is certainly what they constantly accuse each
other of, even as they assert that their own interpretations are faithful.
But someone in this rhetorical stew must actually think that he or she
is being faithful. Not all of these people are opportunists, even if
many of them are mistaken. Moreover, even opportunism has a price
to pay in its effect on the self and the self's commitments.
The rhetoric of legal and political argument alike is premised on the
assumption of fidelity. For a judge to say that fidelity to the Constitu-
tion is not important is scandalous; rather she must say that she has a
deeper fidelity than the superficial views of her opponents. For a poli-
tician to say that she is not faithful to the Constitution is treasonous;
rather she must say that she has faith in the deeper political principles
that underlie the document and remain even to this day its nourishing
source and fountainhead. For a law professor to say that fidelity to
the Constitution is unimportant is to admit that she is no longer doing
constitutional law; rather, she must say that she is faithful to what the
Constitution, properly understood, commands.
In each of these cases, people find it necessary rhetorically to
phrase their arguments in terms of what is most faithful to the Consti-
tution. Perhaps this rhetorical strategy is just that. Perhaps people
say that they are being faithful to the Constitution without really be-
lieving it to be so. Perhaps they say that fidelity is an important good
while secretly thinking it not very important at all. But I doubt that
this accounts for most people in law, politics or the legal academy.
Most of them hope that what they do is faithful to the Constitution.
They want it to be so, they need it to be so, even if they sometimes
have doubts whether it is so. And the question we must ask ourselves
is, what is the meaning of, and the possible dangers in, that hope, that
want and that need?
There are several reasons to be worried about the effects of consti-
tutional fidelity on the self. First, fidelity to the Constitution requires
us to speak and think in the language of the constitutional tradition
and its characteristic concepts and categories. We must phrase our
claims about what is just and unjust in terms of this constitutional dis-
course. And it is by no means clear that everything worth saying
about justice and injustice can be said in this language. Some ways of
thinking about human rights and self-government can be expressed
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only very awkwardly if at all in the language of our Constitution and
its distinctive concepts and doctrinal glosses. We may well be unaware
of how much the increasing formalisms, the gradual encrustations of
constitutional language, hedge and limit our imaginations, obscure our
understanding rather than illuminate it. We may be unaware of this
precisely because these concepts and categories seem so natural to us
as students of the Constitution-because we work with them daily so
that they have become the familiar and regular tools of our constitu-
tional understanding.
The language of the Constitution does not merely affect our under-
standing of it. Many of us are engaged in practices where reference to
the Constitution is a standard method of discussing what is just and
unjust. People who immerse themselves in the Constitution and its
traditions often bring the concepts of that tradition to bear in their
other moral and political judgments. In this way the tools of constitu-
tional thinking infect our attitudes towards basic questions of social
justice and political philosophy. We find that when we discuss these
questions, we turn to the language of the Constitution as second na-
ture. It is a language that warps and limits our imagination about jus-
tice. Yet it is a language we cling to because it has become the only
way we know how to be just, like a neurotic who finds himself replay-
ing a damaging script in all his relationships because it is the only way
he knows how to love and be loved.
There are many examples of these boundaries on our imagination,
which themselves could form the subject of another essay. But the
one which weighs on my mind most heavily these days is the manner
in which the concept of equal protection has been formalized into
questions of fundamental right, suspect classification, substantial bur-
den and tiers of scrutiny. These categories see inequality as a question
of similarity and difference, view oppression as a question of individ-
ual animus, and measure discrimination by inquiries into discreteness,
insularity and immutability. This formalism produces a doctrinal edi-
fice worthy of a thirteenth century scholastic: It offers us a structure
that is used to consider the legal treatment of both debt adjusters and
homosexuals, tax abatements and Mexican-Americans. Not surpris-
ingly, it forms a procrustean bed that fails to do justice to the sociol-
ogy of groups and the construction of group identities in a culture. In
the legal language of our Constitution, it is difficult to talk about caste
and stigma without wrenching them from their sociological bases and
restating them in five-part tests that manage utterly to miss the point
of how status-based injustices are perpetrated and perpetuated. Per-
haps with time our law can become more sociological. But for now
the constitutional language of equality seems to be more a method of
promoting social inequality, the constitutional language of rights
seems to be more a means of inhibiting freedom, and the constitu-
tional language of respect for democracy seems to be more a device
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for stifling the very possibility of self-governance for the vast majority
of people in this country.
Moreover, even when ideas can be expressed in the existing consti-
tutional grammar, some are clearly unpersuasive at any given point in
time, given the political and professional consensus of opinion. If our
discussions are honestly to be faithful interpretations of the Constitu-
tion, we must shut out these implausible claims and considerations; we
must regard them as "off-the-wall" for purposes of the constitutional
discourse of fidelity. That in itself would not be so bad, except that
our commitment to fidelity has a further, and even more disturbing
consequence.
To pledge fidelity to the Constitution is not only to think and talk in
a certain way, it is also to believe something important about the
American system of government. Our fidelity to the Constitution re-
quires us to believe that it is a basically good and just document, and
that it frames the legal system of a basically good and just polity. Of
course there is no logical contradiction in believing at one and the
same time that the Constitution is a basically good and just document
but that it is the legal framework for a deeply unjust land. But there is
an implicit cognitive dissonance here. There is enormous pressure to
believe that the system ordained and established by the document we
pledge fidelity to is itself worthy of respect. Indeed, these beliefs are
mutually supporting, for it is likely that our patriotism is drummed
into us at a much earlier age than our education in the intricacies of
the Constitution. Our Constitution is the greatest charter of liberties
ever devised by the hand of Man precisely because it is our Constitu-
tion, the Constitution of our country.
My point is not a logical one but a psychological one. Nor does it
advert to the longstanding debate between natural law and positivism.
Lots of people who are positivists, who believe that it is logically pos-
sible for law to be unjust nevertheless have a strong psychological
stake in the basic justice of the American Constitution and the Ameri-
can system of government. It is surely philosophically possible for the
Constitution to be deeply unjust, but the question I am interested is
whether it is psychologically possible. Whether natural law advocates
or positivists at heart, it is very hard for most Americans, and espe-
cially for most members of the American legal profession, to come to
terms with and accept the possibility that the American Constitution
might actually be profoundly unfair. They might concede that it has
pockets of injustice, a few clauses and doctrines here and there that
might need reform. Yet the idea that it is, as William Lloyd Garrison
said, a "covenant with death, and an agreement with hell"5 5 is simply
too difficult for most people to accept. If there are constitutional in-
55. Merrill, supra note 15, at 205.
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justices in our society, they are on the order of mindless bureaucracy
and rent control; they are not in the same league as slavery.
Of course, one might object that the reason for this lack of accept-
ance is that the claim of significant and pervasive constitutional evil is
simply unbelievable. But the word unbelievable has two meanings:
first that something is false, and the second that one is simply not able
to believe it. The fact that many people do not see our system of
government as having deep pockets of injustice cannot be a sufficient
proof of their nonexistence, because many people felt the same way
about American institutions before the Warren Court, before Brown
v. Board of Education,56 before the Nineteenth Amendment, and
even before the Civil War when the institution of slavery was at its
zenith. Faith in the essential justice and goodness of American institu-
tions is not a new phenomenon. Indeed, when William Lloyd Garri-
son made his famous statement that the Constitution was an
agreement with hell, it was hardly greeted with approbation. Half the
people thought he was wicked, and the other half thought him insane.
And this was at a time when one could make a fairly good argument
that the Constitutional system was pretty rotten.5 7
There is something about the Constitution, the central text of
American government, that makes people, and especially lawyers,
want to bow down before it. The Constitution invites idolatry.58 And
if we cannot bow down to the Constitution as it actually exists, we will
bow down to a Constitution of our imagination. In this sense, even
the ideal constitutionalist can be an idolator.
I am not enough of a comparativist to know whether other constitu-
tions invite similar degrees of idolatry. I do know that many people
tend to think that their systems of government are pretty good, and
they tend to see injustices as marginal or exceptional to the political
scheme. This phenomenon is part of what social psychologists call
"belief in a just world," and the phenomenon has been observed in
lots of places: not only in liberal democracies like the United States
but also in more repressive regimes like South Africa during the era of
apartheid. 59 Many people, it turns out, tend to think that their gov-
ernments and political systems are basically just, even when to the
outside observer they seem very unjust. It is likely that lawyers are
caught up in this phenomenon even more than the average citizen.
56. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
57. Actually, there were a few Garrisonians who agreed with the resolution, but
their numbers were quite small. In the same way there are always a small number of
people in any age who understand the Constitution to be a pact with hell. But the
wonder is not that they are so few but that they are so many.
58. See Steven D. Smith, Idolatry in Constitutional Interpretation, 79 Va. L. Rev.
583 (1993).
59. See Adrian Furnham, Just World Beliefs in an Unjust Society: A Cross Cultural
Comparison, 15 Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 363 (1985).
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For lawyers are practiced adherents of role morality. If the Constitu-
tion invites idolatry, lawyers are surely the high priests in the temple.
Quite aside from the natural tendencies of all peoples to chauvinism
and belief in a just world, I want to argue that the very attitude of
fidelity to the Constitution is partly responsible for this predicament.
To pledge fidelity to something and simultaneously believe it to be
riddled with evil produces serious cognitive dissonance. That disso-
nance must be alleviated in some way. One must either change one's
beliefs about the facts or one's values, or both. If fidelity to the Con-
stitution cannot be jettisoned-because it is the basic assumption of
constitutional legal argument and constitutional theory-this leaves
only the possibility of reorienting one's beliefs and attitudes about the
situation. There are literally dozens of ways to do this. One can ig-
nore or forget about the existence or extent of injustices or one can
grudgingly accept them as bad but not too bad. One can even offer
apologies for them. And human minds are sufficiently agile that they
can even alternate their attitudes as the occasion demands, one day
decrying the injustices of our society and the next day putting them
out of our mind as we engage in the practice of constitutional fidelity.
Even the most sensitive of us can apply a temporary dose of moral
Novocain when we turn to the intricacies of the American
Constitution.
Committed as most of us are to constitutional fidelity, we cannot
deny the possibility of such psychological pressures at work on us and
in our judgments and attitudes about American society. Rather, we
must recognize them as an inevitable price of fidelity, of pledging faith
in the Constitution. The turn to ideal constitutionalism is simply one
way of assuaging the cognitive dissonance produced by fidelity to the
Constitution in a world of injustice. By separating the ideal Constitu-
tion from positive law and received interpretation, we can blame bad
judges and politicians rather than the document we pledge faith to.
Nevertheless, the pressure to reduce cognitive dissonance affects
even our views about the best interpretation of the Constitution. For
our views about the ideal Constitution are not wholly free from the
political consensus of the time in which we live. Whether radicals or
moderates, our vision of what the Constitution is and could be is
largely derived in response to that consensus and cannot stray too far
from it.
Each of us has a sense of what readings of the Constitution are
plausible and what readings are "off-the-wall" even for the purposes
of a Shadow Constitution. The cognitive dissonance produced by our
faith in the Constitution in an unjust world affects this calculus. First,
we will tend to minimize or selectively ignore those injustices that can-
not be reached by plausible interpretations of the Constitution (in-
cluding our ideal model). Second, and conversely, we will tend to
think that the constitutional reforms necessary to respond to the most
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serious problems of injustice do not require "off-the-wall" constitu-
tional arguments. In other words, there are subtle pressures to believe
that although injustices remain in this country, and are not reached by
the Constitution (including the best interpretation of the Constitu-
tion), they are not seriously and profoundly great injustices. This is
not an attitude about the constitutional injustices of the past, from
which we are suitably distanced and towards which we can be properly
shocked and dismayed, but about the injustices of the present, which
hit us, as the saying goes, where we live.
One might imagine that the ideal Constitution in our heads, the one
that need not hew to precedent or conform to the status quo, the one
that we might impose if we were the Chief Justice and all of the Asso-
ciate Justices together, is some how freed from the pressures of cogni-
tive dissonance. Yet the problems of constitutional evil haunt us even
there. As aspirationalists we can have faith in the Constitution be-
cause we believe that some day it will be redeemed, and on the day of
its redemption it will live up to its promises of basic justice and de-
cency for all. But what if we were convinced that the day of redemp-
tion would be grossly insufficient, that the Constitution will always
leave in place serious and profound evils? In that case even the gam-
bit of ideal constitutionalism still produces cognitive dissonance, for it
is not clear why such a document deserves our fidelity when even its
finest version is so seriously wanting in justice. Therefore the ideal
constitutionalist must believe that someday every valley shall be ex-
alted, and every mountain and hill laid low, the crooked straight and
the rough places plain, even if that day is far off and requires great
struggle to achieve. But the flip side of that faith is that the injustices
that the ideal Constitution does not and cannot reach cannot be deep
and profound ones; they cannot be of the same magnitude as slavery.
Mark Graber has recently noted that from the standpoint of today's
left, the best example of an injustice that the Constitution does not
respond to is the distribution of income in this country.60 When
pressed to defend themselves against the charge of judicial activism by
giving an example of a situation they find undesirable though not un-
constitutional, liberals can happily point to distributional considera-
tions.61 But this may simply reflect the fact that liberals have given up
on pushing for redistributional reforms in the present political era, an
attitude reflected both in the generally conservative shift in American
politics in the past twenty years and the current constitutional consen-
sus that has responded to this shift. Certainly in the 1960s the consti-
60. Mark A. Graber, The Clintonification of American Law and Liberal Constitu-
tional Theory, 5-8 (1996) (unpublished manuscript on fie with the Fordham Law
Review).
61. See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 32, at 36 (arguing that the jurisprudential princi-
ple of integrity "would bar any attempt to argue" that the Constitution requires eco-
nomic equality or distributional rights).
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tutionalization of welfare rights was very much on the agenda of the
liberal academy, even if it was not yet written into the positive law of
the Constitution.62 If the argument for constitutional protection of
the poor is "off-the-wall" now, it is because in a conservative age more
people (and particularly more elites) seem complacent about the dis-
tribution of income.
Indeed, we can flip Graber's point the other way: If we thought
that the most serious injustice facing our country today was the distri-
bution of income and the plight of the poor-as opposed to racial or
sexual discrimination or the right to abortion-why is the argument
that the Constitution forbids this evil clearly "off-the-wall"? Why is
this not the greatest problem of constitutional evil since slavery? Why
is it not slavery? And if we really believed that it was so evil, and the
country that permits this oppression to continue so wicked, why
should we respect a Constitution that permits such evils, empowers
governments to worsen them and may even prevent some forms of
amelioration?
These questions are more troubling for liberals than for economic
libertarians and traditional conservatives. The latter groups are not so
troubled by maldistribution, because it is a necessary if unfortunate
consequence of their vision of social justice. But we liberals (and here
I include myself in this category) have been blinded in part precisely
by our sense of fidelity to the Constitution and the constitutional tra-
dition to believe that what the Constitution sanctions cannot be as bad
as slavery, that there is no serious remaining problem of constitutional
evil in the best interpretation of the Constitution, only relatively mi-
nor ones.
These positions reflect the psychological pressures that the exercise
of constitutional fidelity places upon us. Our fidelity to the Constitu-
tion is partly our fidelity to the governing political ideology of our
time, and to the political realities it seems to impose on us. Ironically,
even the ideals of our time reflect its realities; even the possibilities of
utopian constitutional thought uncannily respond to the sense of the
politically possible. Utopianism, like so many other features of
human thought, is social; often there is nothing so parochial as peo-
ples' visions of what transcends the limits of their society's thinking.
The pressure of constitutional fidelity, coupled with the ideological
pressures of our political moment, may cause us to turn our attentions
away from injustices we might see around us, and thus hide the very
possibility of serious and sustained constitutional evil. In this way,
pressures to reduce cognitive dissonance affect not only our attitudes
about what is just or unjust, but also our attitudes about what forms
62. See, eg., Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the
Fourteenth Amendment, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 7 (1969) (arguing for a constitutional right
to minimum welfare); see also Graber, supra note 59, at 12-16 (discussing liberal argu-
ments for constitutionalization of welfare rights).
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part of the "Shadow Constitution," the ideal Constitution of best in-
terpretations that academics hope will someday become the positive
law of the Constitution.
If my analysis is correct, it would apply equally well to enlightened
constitutional thought during the time of slavery. Fidelity to the Con-
stitution combined with the general recognition that the Constitution
protected slavery during the antebellum period probably led many
progressives to think that slavery, although an evil, was not so great an
evil that it had to be abolished immediately, and that a compromise of
some sort could be struck with the South and its "peculiar institution."
And indeed, I have just described the antebellum position of many
"progressive" thinkers on slavery, including Abraham Lincoln.63 The
63. For example, in Lincoln's October 16, 1854 speech at Peoria, Illinois, he makes
no secret of his hatred of slavery and his recognition of it as a serious moral evil.
Abraham Lincoln, Speech on the Kansas-Nebraska Act at Peoria Illinois, in Abraham
Lincoln: Speeches and Writings 1832-1858, at 307, 315 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed.,
1989). Yet he too is shaped by the political realities of his time, and he offers this
famous equivocation:
When southern people tell us they are no more responsible for the origin
of slavery, than we; I acknowledge the fact. When it is said that the institu-
tion exists; and that it is very difficult to get rid of it, in any satisfactory way,
I can understand and appreciate the saying. I surely will not blame them for
not doing what I should not know how to do myself.... I think I would not
hold one in slavery, at any rate; yet the point is not clear enough for me to
denounce people upon. What next? Free them, and make them politically
and socially, our equals? My own feelings will not admit of this; and if mine
would, we well know that those of the great mass of white people will not.
Whether this feeling accords with justice and sound judgment, is not the sole
question, if indeed, it is any part of it. A universal feeling, whether well or
ill-founded, can not be safely disregarded. We can not, then, make them
equals. It does seem to me that systems of gradual emancipation might be
adopted; but for their tardiness in this, I will not undertake to judge our
brethren of the south.
When they remind us of their constitutional rights, I acknowledge them,
not grudgingly, but fully, and fairly; and I would give them any legislation for
the reclaiming of their fugitives, which should not, in its stringency, be more
likely to carry a free man into slavery, than our ordinary criminal laws are to
hang an innocent one.
Id. at 316-17. Four years later, in August 1858, Lincoln repeated these words verbatim
in the First Lincoln-Douglas Debate. First Lincoln-Douglas Debate, Lincoln's Reply,
in Abraham Lincoln: Speeches and Writings 1832-1858, supra, at 508, 510-11.
Thus, in 1854, Lincoln took the "moderate" position of arguing for the retention of
the Missouri Compromise, which prevented the expansion of slavery north of the
compromise line. Slavery in the South was not morally unbearable as a cost of pre-
serving the union, although slavery in new territories was:
Let it not be said I am contending for the establishment of political and
social equality between the whites and blacks. I have already said the con-
trary. I am not now combatting the argument of NECESSITY, arising from
the fact that the blacks are already amongst us; but I am combating what is
set up as MORAL argument for allowing them to be taken where they have
never yet been-arguing against the EXTENSION of a bad thing, which
where it already exists, we must of necessity, manage as we best can.
Abraham Lincoln, Speech on the Kansas-Nebraska Act at Peoria Illinois, in Abraham
Lincoln: Speeches and Writings 1832-1858, supra, at 329. He reasserted this view in
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enlightened liberal position on slavery, detesting it but doubting its
unconstitutionality and wishing to make peace with the slave-holding
South, is not the attitude of some bygone era. It is the attitude of the
contemporary liberal constitutionalist. It is the attitude of the "en-
lightened" liberal in a conservative age.
Precisely because utopianism is social, the boundaries of utopian
thought may change rapidly when circumstances produce relatively
quick shifts in public opinion. Cataclysmic events like the Civil War
no doubt profoundly influenced the center of American public opin-
ion both in the North and the South, and thus made many things
thinkable that were unthinkable before.6' Conversely, the strong shift
to the right in American public opinion over the last thirty years has
made many extreme forms of right-wing utopian thought thinkable
and sayable.
The case of homosexual rights is a perfect example of how the pos-
sibilities of utopian constitutional thought are shaped by the existing
political configuration. In the current constitutional politics of the
moment, homosexual rights are something that is "on the table"; they
offer an interpretation of the Constitution that is "on the wall" even
though it is not yet enshrined in positive constitutional doctrine and is
bitterly resisted by many conservatives. Under these conditions, the
left can recognize and even luxuriate in the serious injustice of current
doctrine and its lack of fidelity to the "real" Constitution. The protec-
tion of homosexuals is "not yet" in the positive law of the Constitu-
tion, but it will be some day and deserves to be. On the other hand,
the present generation of liberals has largely given up thinking that
the protection of the poor is "not yet" in the Constitution. They now
tend to think that it just isn't in there at all, even in the Shadow Con-
stitution. For this reason I suspect that there are many more liberals
who think that Bowers v. Hardwick,65 Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.6
the First Lincoln-Douglas Debate. First Lincoln-Douglas Debate, Lincoln's Reply, in
Abraham Lincoln: Speeches and Writings 1832-1858, supra, at 511-12.
64. For example, only nine years after his Peoria speech, in which he judged the
complete abolition of slavery impractical, Lincoln felt it possible to issue the Emanci-
pation Proclamation and free slaves in the rebelling states (although not in the north-
ern or border states). See Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation and Final
Emancipation Proclamation, in Abraham Lincoln: Speeches and Writings 1832-1858,
supra note 63, at 368, 424. The Civil War made the abolition of slavery thinkable to
large numbers of white Americans. The passage of 25 years from 1969 to 1994 has
had the opposite effect on Frank Michelman's argument for constitutional guarantees
of minimum levels of assistance. Indeed, the statutory guarantee of minimum assist-
ance has been abolished in the 1996 Welfare Reform Act signed into law by the "lib-
eral" Democratic President William Jefferson Clinton. See Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996); Francis X. Clines,
Clinton Signs Bill Cutting Welfare. States in New Role, N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1996, at
Al.
65. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding Georgia antisodomy law).
66. 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (striking down affirmative action preferences for govern-
ment contractors).
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and R.A.V. v. St. Paul67 are bad constitutional law than those who
think that Dandridge v. Williams 68 is. This is no doubt reflected in the
larger number of recent articles on the former subjects than the latter.
The difference between Bowers and Dandridge is the difference be-
tween the recognition of a temporary constitutional evil that we can
live with-because we can claim that the "real" Constitution does not
sanction it-and the recognition of a more permanent constitutional
evil that we cannot live with; hence we have given up believing that
the "real" Constitution forbids it.
One might object to this entire line of argument on the grounds that
it overlooks an important feature of the American constitutional tra-
dition-the principle of constitutional modesty. The Constitution, it is
said, is a document for people of "fundamentally differing views"69
and different times, made to endure "the various crises of human af-
fairs."'70 The Constitution is not designed, nor can it be designed, to
right every evil and social injustice. It merely establishes and protects
the basic structures of a democratic state. The enormous number of
injustices that flow within such a state are no concern of the Constitu-
tion. Only those having to do with basic human rights and basic dem-
ocratic governance are its concern. Hence we can pledge fidelity to
the Constitution if it does those things well and no others, and there is
no cognitive dissonance created by that pledge, no need for spiritual
compromise or self-deception. We do not expect a plumber to be an
electrician, or a doctor to be an engineer. Each has her own virtues;
we believe no less in one person's skill because she lacks the skills of
another person doing another set of tasks. In the same way, the test
of our fidelity to the Constitution should concern whether it ade-
quately performs the limited set of tasks we expect of it-establishing
a democracy and protecting basic human rights. To ask more of it is
immature; it is not the demand of fidelity but of aggrandizement.
All of this is true enough. All constitutional scholars subscribe to
some version of constitutional modesty; no one thinks that the Consti-
tution rights all wrongs. But the question is rather how we define the
contours of the Constitution's modest set of tasks, and what role the
need to reduce cognitive dissonance plays in the setting of these
boundaries.
For example, how does the argument for constitutional modesty
look when applied to the case of slavery? Would we say that slavery
presents no problems for constitutional fidelity because the Constitu-
67. 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (striking down criminalization of cross burning and related
forms of hate speech).
68. 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (upholding system of maximum grants for welfare recipi-
ents regardless of family size and holding that poverty is not a suspect classification).
69. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J. dissenting).
70. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 415 (1819) (Marshall, CJ.) (emphasis
omitted).
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tion is simply not designed to right that particular wrong? Would we
say that it creates no psychological pressures for the reduction of cog-
nitive dissonance because we don't really expect the Constitution to
eradicate all evils? Or would we say, on the contrary, that, as applied
to this case, the conclusion that the Constitution was not designed to
eradicate all evils is a consequence of the need to reduce cognitive
dissonance caused by its sanctioning of slavery?
Of course, one might respond that the case of slavery is quite differ-
ent from any evils we face today. Fidelity to the Constitution was
troubling when the positive law of the Constitution permitted slavery
precisely because the existence of that evil threatened basic human
liberties and the ideal of democratic self-governance. Slaves are
human beings too, and they deserve basic rights and the power of self-
governance as much as their putative masters. But this answer shows
that the "proper agenda" of the Constitution, the appropriate realm of
its modesty, is not fixed, but malleable depending on our understand-
ing of the gravity of the situation before us. The question of what
constitutes a serious denial of human rights or democratic self-govern-
ment is not given in advance, but must be worked out through reflec-
tion and experience. And this activity of reflection and experience is
precisely where the psychological pressures I am describing find their
home.
If we thought that the conditions of poverty and denial of equal
opportunity in this country were so serious as to make a hollow mock-
ery of the Constitution's promises of human rights and democracy,
why would the alleviation of these conditions not be part of the Con-
stitution's "modest" agenda? If one thought that this country sup-
ports and reproduces "savage inequalities '71 that make the lives of
millions of its citizens miserable and relegate millions of its children to
lives of unremitting desperation, pain and psychological trauma, why
would the argument from constitutional modesty not ring as hollow as
it does in the case of slavery? Conversely, to what extent does our
disbelief that these inequalities do make a mockery of the Constitu-
tion and our calm assurance that there are some evils the Constitution
cannot deal with stem not from principled reflection but psychological
necessity? Claims of constitutional modesty are not a solution to the
problem of constitutional evil; they are a restatement of it.
Some twenty years ago, Barbara Jordan, then a freshman Congress-
woman from Texas, made an impassioned statement at the House Ju-
diciary Committee hearings on the impeachment of Richard Nixon.
"My faith in the Constitution," Jordan said, "is whole, it is complete, it
is total, and I am not going to sit here and be an idle spectator to the
diminution, the subversion, the destruction of the Constitution."'
71. Jonathan Kozol, Savage Inequalities: Children in America's Schools (1991).
72. Francis X Clines, Barbara Jordan Dies at 59; Her Voice Stirred the Nation,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1996, at Al, B10.
1997] 1737
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
These are stirring words even today, especially moving given that they
were uttered by an African-American woman who had endured many
hardships and would endure many more in her all too brief life and
political career. Like Barbara Jordan, I too want to believe in the
Constitution. I want to remain faithful to it, and I want others in the
legal profession, government administrators, legislators and judges to
remain faithful to it as well. I am deeply saddened and troubled when
they betray it and its promises, when they trample on its letter and its
spirit for political advantage and personal gain. I believe, moreover,
that the Constitution is more than its positive law, that the Constitu-
tion has not yet been redeemed, and I hope every day for its eventual
redemption. I know that many who read these words join me in this
hope. But as you, and I, and all of us expound our faith in the Consti-
tution, we must also understand what our faith does to us. We must
recognize that fidelity to the Constitution has a power over us, that
fidelity is not only legitimate but that it also legitimates. When we
discuss fidelity, we are not discussing a property of interpretation but
a predicament of human existence. To be faithful is to gamble, and
the stakes we offer are not our property but our integrity, not only our
lives and fortunes, but our Sacred Honor. Let us have faith then, but
let us have faith that our faith is not in vain.
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